

TOP SECRET

25X1



6 November 1961

Copy No. *ED7*

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000340001-7

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000340001-7

6 November 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS



25X1

3. USSR: TASS statement implies USSR will continue nuclear testing. (*Page ii*)
4. South Vietnam: Moscow and Peiping attempt to generate international alarm over General Taylor's mission. (*Page iii*)

25X6



25X1

8. India: Nehru reportedly instructs his ambassador in Moscow to protest Soviet nuclear tests. (*Page v*)
9. Dominican Republic: Ramfis Trujillo pressing for early relaxation of OAS sanctions. (*Page vi*)
10. Ecuador: Rioting in provincial city touched off by President Velasco's visit on 3 November. (*Page vii*)

25X1



Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

USSR: In the first official reaction to President Kennedy's 2 November statement on US testing plans, a TASS statement strongly implies that the USSR will continue its tests in the future on the pretext that the resumption of US tests, particularly if these are conducted in the atmosphere, will place the Soviet Union at a military disadvantage. This statement, however, is more cautious than the position Khrushchev is reported by the Western press to have taken in his talks with Italian Minister Pisanelli on 3 November.

TASS, quoting "leading circles in the USSR," charges the President's statement shows that the US is seeking an "illusory

6 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

superiority in nuclear armaments." The TASS statement said that if US tests continue and are resumed in the atmosphere, the "other side," i.e. the Soviet Union, will "be forced by circumstances to come to corresponding conclusions for itself." Noting that the USSR has conducted fewer tests than the combined total of the US, Britain, and France, the TASS statement asserts that the Soviet Union has a "full moral right to equalize the situation and not to allow a discrepancy" between the number of Western and Soviet tests. The statement ignores the President's offer to conclude a test ban treaty with adequate inspections and controls, and repeats the standard Soviet proposal to sign immediately a treaty on general and total disarmament which would discontinue tests permanently. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Communist China - USSR - South Vietnam: Moscow and Peiping are attempting to generate international alarm over the possible consequences of General Taylor's mission to South Vietnam. On 3 November the USSR issued a Foreign Ministry statement repeating charges of "aggressive US actions" in South Vietnam--actions which Moscow claimed are creating a "threat to peace and security in Southeast Asia." Peiping, in a 5 November editorial linking the situations in Laos and South Vietnam, stated that the "Chinese people cannot but express their serious concern over the menace to peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

25X1

[REDACTED] The Chinese Communist press representative in Geneva is reported to be "noticeably active" in attempting to learn the outcome of the general's mission. The Chinese press representative told [REDACTED] that it would be "a terrible thing" if American troops were sent to South Vietnam. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

6 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1


Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000340001-7

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000340001-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000340001-7


25X1



25X1
25X1

India: Nehru on 30 October reportedly directed the Indian ambassador in Moscow to protest to the Soviet Government against its nuclear tests. [redacted]

25X1



25X1

25X1

[redacted] Nehru is deeply concerned over the recent criticism of India in the US, [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] and intent on convincing US leaders that India is [redacted]

6 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

25X1

25X1

[pursuing a "balanced" foreign policy not determined by "two standards."]

[Such a balance, however, is likely to require that Indian criticism of the USSR be kept within bounds.]

25X1

[] both Nehru and Menon believe India must remain on friendly terms with Khrushchev as the only means of influencing him toward a moderate course in East-West relations. Moreover, Nehru feels that Khrushchev's efforts to restrain Peiping provide the only effective deterrent to an aggressive Chinese Communist policy toward India. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

Dominican Republic: [General Ramfis Trujillo advised US Consul General Hill through a special emissary on 3 November and again on 4 November that the government would probably not be able to survive if action were not taken by 10 November toward a partial lifting of OAS economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic. These assertions are a continuation of the pressure by President Balaguer's regime to achieve an easing of sanctions. They probably also reflect the equally strong pressures on Ramfis by civilian and military officials linked to the former dictatorship of Generalissimo Trujillo who feel that their survival hinges on Ramfis' retention of military power.]

25X1

[The major opposition parties, on the other hand, continue to press for Ramfis' retirement. Hill reports that an important segment of public opinion would probably view any easing of OAS sanctions prior to this development as the loss of the opposition's principal protection against repressive government action.]

25X1

25X1

6 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

Ecuador: Opposition rioting in the provincial city of Cuenca was occasioned by President Velasco's visit there on 3 November. The violence in Cuenca, which is symptomatic of growing public unrest, follows widespread disturbances exploited by leftist elements in early October in connection with a general strike attempt. Although Velasco's position does not seem to be immediately threatened, further disturbances and plotting by both rightist and leftist groups are likely. [REDACTED]

25X1

6 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Political Unrest in Ecuador

The 3 November disturbances marked the fourth day of unrest in Cuenca and resulted in several deaths and casualties. The outbreaks are believed to reflect general discontent with depressed economic conditions and the central government's inertia and neglect of local areas. The city has been placed under military rule, as occurred in three other provincial capitals during rioting in early October.

Velasco's political support has declined rapidly in recent weeks, partly because of his government's ineptitude in dealing with the declining economic situation, his pro-Cuban foreign policies, and dissension within his own heterogeneous Velasquista political faction. Tension may ease somewhat--at least temporarily--after the approaching adjournment of Congress, over which the President retains only a tenuous control. Velasco's supporters in mid-October resorted to force in order to disrupt a congressional meeting, which culminated in a shooting fracas. During his first two terms as President (1934-35 and 1944-47), Velasco's conflicts with the Congress contributed to his forced removal from office.

Velasco's opposition from both the right and the left has become increasingly aggressive since the violence of early October. Velasco has broken with two of his key lieutenants and previously prominent Velasquista leaders: Vice President Arosemena, ex officio president of the Senate who charged Velasco with attempted assassination in connection with the recent violence in Congress, and Manuel Araujo, the pro-Communist former minister of government. These two men, who have presidential ambitions and have sought the leadership of Communist-leftist groups, have probably drained off a sizable portion of Velasco's leftist support within his own party. Leftist groups now opposing him include the principal student organization and the Communist-dominated principal labor organization, which launched the partly successful general strike effort in early October.

The moderate-rightist opposition recently formed a loose coalition--the Bureau of Democratic Parties--and has considered

25X1

the alternative of trying to work with the administration to bring about a reversal of Velasco's pro-Cuban policy and a crackdown on the radicals. Some military elements, including a number of previously top-level officers involuntarily retired by the President and others on active duty, are also reportedly organizing for action in the event of a breakdown of public order or a leftist attempt to seize power. These officers maintain liaison with the Bureau but apparently are not actively plotting Velasco's overthrow at present.

Among the negative factors favoring Velasco are the division and uncertainty among both his leftist and rightist opponents on a course of action. For example, the military strongly distrust Arosemena as a leftist but also consider themselves the guardian of constitutional order and are keenly aware that Arosemena holds the legal right of succession if Velasco retires, voluntarily or otherwise.

In a speech in Cuenca on 3 November, Velasco rejected opposition demands for his resignation and blamed the Communists primarily for his current difficulties. A report that the Cuban chargé in Quito has been asked to leave Ecuador suggests that the pressures on Velasco for a modification of his pro-Cuban policies may be beginning to have some effect.

25X1

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET